This site makes one argument in two halves. Part I is why I think a world that builds sufficiently capable AI is likely to be a world with nobody home in it — a case that runs through consciousness, other minds, and what utility functions actually select for. Part II is what I think can be done about it, which is where most of the work is.
The short version of Part II: attach a large statutory penalty to a narrow class of frontier activity, pay a bounty out of that penalty to anyone on earth who brings evidence leading to a conviction, and require the individual researcher — not the firm — to carry liability insurance against it. The insurance is the load-bearing part. A fine nobody can pay deters nobody, and a premium is a price on your colleagues’ silence: firm cover pools the conspiracy, individual cover divides it. Enforcement funds itself out of the penalties, so no legislature has to find the money, and adoption needs a number and a court rather than a treaty body. If it works, almost nothing happens — the deterrence is the product, and that makes it hard to measure.
That is the whole mechanism. The two-minute version fills it in; the sequence below argues it.
If none of the AI-risk framing is familiar, aisafety.info is the primer I actually recommend, and I would rather you read it than my compressed version of it.
A note on provenance: this is a signed rewrite of the anonymous extinction-bounties.github.io , and the original 2022 post is at andrew-quinn.me/ai-bounties . This site is canonical. Nothing here is directed at anyone in particular — see non-targeting .